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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-CAPACITY TO COMMIT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CRIME-VALIDITY OF THE XYY SYNDROME AS PART OF THE DEFENSE
OF INSANITY.
On August 19, 1974, Charles Yukl brutally killed twenty-three-
year-old Karen Schlegal. After Yukl was indicted and charged with
murder, his attorney submitted a motion requesting a bifurcated
trial1 and appointment of a cytogeneticist, at the state's expense,
to conduct chromosomal2 tests of Yukl's blood. The chromosomal
tests would have been used to determine whether Yukl had a gene-
tic imbalance (the XYY syndrome) , which may have a relation-
1. The Supreme Court, New York County, Trial Term, held that the requested bifurcated
trial procedure, where the insanity defense would be tried first and a second jury would
determine guilt if the defendant were found sane, was not feasible because it would cause
further delays in the trial of cases, and it would jeopardize due process to require the
state to first determine whether the defendant was sane or insane, and then to possibly
institutionalize him before his guilt was determined in the crime. People v. Yukl, 372
N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (1975).
2. Chromosomes are threadlike structures of complex molecules which transmit genetic
information, and which determine the heredity of all plant and animal life. Human beings
characteristically have 46 chromosomes in the nucleus of each cell. Egg and sperm cells
contain 23 chromosomes each, but upon uniting, the chromosomes are pooled so that the
now individual has 46 chromosomes arranged in 23 pairs. Twenty-two of the 23 pairs
of chromosomes in each cell are called autosomes, which determine most of the biological
characteristics of the individual; while the remaining pair are referred to as gonosomes,
which determine the person's primary sexual characteristics.
Women normally have two gonosomes called X chromosomes (XX), while most
men have an X chromosome paired with a Y chromosome (XY). Some individuals are
born with chromosome abnormalities, and have either too few or too many chromosomes.
One of these abnormalities is the so-called XYY syndrome (XYY). See generally W. KEETON,
BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 488 (2d ed. 1972).
A number of related studies have produced evidence suggesting a link between the
XYY syndrome and criminal behavior. These studies suggest that XYY males have been
found to be more than normally aggressive and impulsive, tall In stature, and usually
below average in intelligence. Facial acne is common In adolescense In such males. These
studies emphasize that XYY males make up only a small proportion of the criminal popu-
lation and that not all XYY males become criminals. The biological mechanism that may
cause the relationship between genetic composition and deviant behavior in XYY males
has not been determined. One possibility is that the normal XY male derives his normal
amount of aggressiveness from his Y chromosome, and that the addition of an extra Y
chromosome gives him a double dose of aggressiveness. Another possibility is that the
Y chromosome might have led to the excessive production of androgens during early de-
velopment. This might influence brain structure and functioning and may result in un-
usually aggressive behavior patterns in later life. See generally J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 392-94 (4th ed. 1972).
3. The abnormality denominated the XYY syndrome Is detected by taking a blood
sample from the individual to be tested, culturing the white blood cells for one week, stop-
ping by chemical means the meiosis of the cells, straining and photographing them, and
then pairing the 46 normal chromosomes and identifying the extra Y sex chromosomes.
This method, the Lejeune test, Is a recognized method for ascertaining the number of
chromosomes in an individual. The test is normally conducted on a sufficient number of
cells to eliminate the Possibility of a chance occurrence of the XYY character.
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ship to antisocial behavior,4 and thus possibly admissible as part
of the defense of insanity. The Supreme Court, Trial Term, New
York County, held that the genetic imbalance theory of crime cau-
sation had not been sufficiently established and accepted to warrant
admission of evidence with regard to the XYY syndrome as part of
the defense of insanity. People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1975).
The insanity defense, simply stated, is a device by which a de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding can gain acquittal by showing that
his mental condition did not satisfy a minimum standard at the time
the criminal act was committed. 5 The insanity defense in the Uni-
ted States exists in four major formulations: 6 the M'Naughten test,7
the irresistable impulse test," the Durham test, 9 and the American
Law Institute (ALI) test.' 0
The M'Naughten test is based upon rules set forth in an 1843
English decision, M'Naughten's Case." Before an insanity defense
Is established under this test:
it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the commit-
ting of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he
4. See Note 2, supra.
5. Although the XYY anomaly is a physical malady, it may be admissible in an In-
sanity defense if It is shown that it can cause mental disturbance. See generally Note,
The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEO. L.J. 892 (1969); Comment, The XYY Syndrome
and the Judicial System, 6 N.C. CENTRAL L.J. 66 (1974). The problem of showing a link
between the XYY syndrome and the defendant's mental disturbance is similar to the
problem encountered by the epilepsy defense in its early stages. When defense counsel
first attempted to offer into evidence at trial testimony showing that defendants may have
been suffering from epilepsy at the time the criminal acts in question were committed,
courts insisted, as a condition precedent to the admissibility of this evidence, that an
expert show a link between the physical malady and the mental disturbance. Later, when
It was generally accepted by medical science that epilepsy could have a serious effect on
the defendant's behavior, the courts began to take judicial notice of this fact, and merely
required testimony showing that the defendant suffered from the malady. State v. Wright,
112 Iowa 416, -, 84 N.W. 541, 542 (1900); People v. Barber, 115 N.Y. 475, -, 22
N.E. 182, 188 (1889); People v. Codarre, 245 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (1963), affireed, 14 N.Y.2d
370, 200 N.E.2d 570, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 883 (1964).
In general, the traditional test for determining whether a scientific principle or
discovery has become accepted as fact, and thus admissible in evidence at trial, Is that
"the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which It belongs." Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, -,
192 N.W.2d 432, 438 (1971); People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, -, 72 Cal. 1Rptr.
478, 493 (1968). A competing formula sets out a less demanding standard: a qualified
expert witness may testify concerning any relevant conclusions of a particular test or
experiment notwithstanding the fact that some experts may disagree as to its accuracy,
such objections going to the weight of the evidence but not to its admissibility. McKay v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. Rpt. 416, 235 S.W.2d 173, 174 (1950). See People v. Conterno, 170
Cal. 2d 817, -, 339 P.2d 968, 973 (1959). See generally Note, Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained by Scientific Devices and Analyses, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 5 (1952).
6. W. LAFAVE) & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 269 (1972) (hereinafter cited as LA-
FAVE).
7. This test is based upon criterion established in M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L. 1843) ; See Notes 11-12, infra, and text accompanying.
8. See Note 22, infra, and text accompanying.
9' This test Is based upon standards set forth in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See Notes 31-32, infra, and the text accompanying.
10. See Notes 40-41, infra, and text accompanying.
11. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). See LAFAVE at 274.
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did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what
was wrong. 12
It appears unlikely that a successful insanity defense could be
based upon the XYY syndrome under the M'Naughten rules. 13  If
medical research does not establish a definite relationship between
the XYY abnormality and the defendant's behavior, there will be
no evidence from which it could be concluded that an accused
was unable to understand the nature of his act, or that he was un-
able to comprehend that his act was wrong. 14 Presently, there is no
suggestion that possession of the extra Y chromosome by itself af-
fects a person's ability to appreciate either the nature and quality
of his acts or whether they are wrong.15
In the case of People v. Tanner,16 the XYY defense was found
not to satisfy the requirements of California's version of the M'Naugh-
ten rule. 1" In that case, Raymond Tanner pleaded guilty to a charge
of assault with intent to commit murder. He was then sent to Atas-
cadero State Hospital for study as a possible mentally disordered
sex offender. There, it was discovered that he had the XYY chrom-
osome abnormality, and on this basis Tanner attempted to change
his plea to not guilty by reason of insanity. However, after hearing
evidence introduced on the XYY chromosome findings, the trial
judge refused to permit Tanner to change his plea, and this deci-
sion was affirmed on appeal.18 The California Court of Appeal held
the defense's expert testimony and studies deficient, 19 and concluded
12. M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
13. See generally Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892, 907 (1969)
Note, Criminal Law: The XYY Chromosome Complement and Criminal Conduct, 22 OKLA.
L. REV. 287, 298 (1969).
14. People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313, 319 (1975).
15. Many commentators feel that the XYY syndrome sampling involved in tests under-
taken thus far has been inadequate and inconclusive. See Burke, The "XYY Syndrome":
Genetics, Behavior and the Law, 46 DENVER L.J. 261 (1969); Note, XYY Chromosomal
Abnormality: Use and Misuse in the Legal Process, 9 HARV. J. LEGis. 469 (1972).
16. 13 Cal. App. 3d 596, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1970).
17. *The trial court in People v. Tanner, 13 Cal. App. 3d 596, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1970),
instructed the jury as follows on the issue of insanity :
Insanity, as the word is used in these instructions, means a diseased or de-
ranged condition of the mind which renders a person incapable of knowing
or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or unable to distinguish
right from wrong in relation to that act.
California Jury Instruction, CALJTC 801 (1.967 Revision).
18. People v. Tanner, 13 Cal. App. 3d 596, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1970).
19. Id. at 601, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 659. The court noted:
The studies of the -47 XYY individuals" undertaken to this time are few,
they are rudimentary in scope, and their results are at best inconclusive ...
[Tihe testimony of appellant's expert witnesses suggests only that aggres-
sive behavior may be one manifestation of the XYY Syndrome. The evidence
collected by these experts does not suggest that all XYY individuals are by
nature involuntarily aggressive. Some identified XYY individuals have not
exhibited such behavior. . . . rT]he experts could not determine whether
appellant's aggressive behavior, namely, the commission of an assault with
intent to commit murder, resulted from his chromosomal abnormality. Second,
none of the expert witnesses on genetics testified that possession of this extra
Y chromosome results in mental disease which constitutes legal insanity un-
der the California version of the M'Naughten Rule. ...
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that the evidence of the XYY condition should be excluded because
such evidence was not clear and convincing. 20
The test of responsibility in several states is the irresistible im-
pulse test.2 1 Under this test, an individual is not considered respon-
sible for a criminal act if, though he knew his act was wrongful,
he was unable to control his actions because of a mental impair-
ment.22 Under this test, if it is found that the XYY syndrome sat-
isfies the requirement of mental disease or impairment, it would ap-
pear that evidence of the chromosome abnormality would be admis-
sible on the issue of whether such abnormality rendered the indivi-
dual unable to control his behavior.23 It must be shown, however,
that the abnormality causes the individual difficulty in preventing
himself from behaving in an anti-social manner.2 4 Considerable dif-
ficulty, as opposed to total incapacity, may not be enough to satis-
fy the requirements of the irresistible impulse test, because the test
is sometimes stated in absolute terms, requiring an individual's total
inability to control his actions.2 5
Research to date has not indicated that the XYY syndrome
could produce complete inability to control behavior.21 Because of
this, the success or failure of an insanity plea based upon the XYY
syndrome will probably depend upon whom the burden of persuasion
rests.2 7 Where the burden of persuasion is upon the defendant to af-
firmatively prove lack of criminal responsibility, evidence of the XYY
defect will probably not meet this burden.2 However, in those jur-
isdictions in which the burden of persuasion is upon the prosecution,
and the defendant only has a burden to introduce evidence to rebut
a presumption of sanity,2 the XYY abnormality might serve as
the basis of a sufficient defense because a lesser amount of evi-
dence, proving that his criminal action was the result of a disease-
20. Id. at 602, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 659. The court analogized to other scientific data such
as voice print analysis, Kell-Cellano blood grouping tests, testimony given under hypnosis,
testimony given after sodium pentothal has been administered, and lie detector testing,
all of which have likewise been denied admission into evidence because they fail to reach
the necessary standards of acceptance and reliability.
21. See LAFAVE at 283.
22. Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959).
Even if the defendant were able to appreciate the nature of the act he was
committing, and that it was wrong, he still might not be responsible if he had
suffered such an impairment of mind as to render him incapable of choosing
the right and refraining from doing the wrong.
Id. at -, 346 P.2d at 1027.
23. See generally Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892, 907-09 (1969).
24. Id.
25. "[T]he irresistible impulse criterion presupposes a complete impairment of capacity
for self-control." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment, at 158 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
26. See Note 15, aupra.
27. See generally LAFAVE at 312-817.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 812; citing H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 241-272
(1954).
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precipitated inability to control his behavior, may be needed in
order to pass the burden of production to the prosecution."
The XYY syndrome is a potentially significant factor in an in-
sanity defense in a Durham test s' jurisdiction. Under this test, the
accused is not criminally responsible if he is suffering from a men-
tal disease or defect, and his act was the product of the disease or
defect.32 The XYY syndrome, it appears, will be useful in a Durham
test jurisdiction only if it can satisfy the definition of "mental disease"
in relation to the "product" portion of the test.
The term "mental disease or defect" has been defined in Mc-
Donald v. United States33 as "any abnormal condition of the mind
which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and sub-
stantially impairs behavior controls. ' 3 4 It appears that the XYY syn-
drome might fit within the scope of this definition. If the presence
of an extra Y chromosome causes serious personality disorders in an
individual, an abnormality of the mind would seem to exist which
would substantially affect the defendant's mental processes.
The "product of" wording in Durham necessitates a but-for re-
lationship between the mental disease and the criminal act.3 5 Under
the Durham test, there is a presumption of sanity, which can be
rebutted by the introduction of evidence or mental disease.3 6 After
introduction of such evidence, the burden is on the prosecution to dis-
prove either the existence of the disease, or the causal relationship
between it and the act. 37 However, on the practical level, there is
little emphasis on the "product" concept . 3  The definition of mental
disease, by stressing the lack of behavioral controls, makes it very
likely that a jury will conclude that an abnormality such as the XYY
syndrome caused the act if they believe that the accused suffered
from a disease.39
The American Law Institute developed the ALI test of insanity
in its Model Penal Code:
30. If the XYY defect is deemed sufficient to place the burden of proving sanity on
the prosecution, some showing that the accused was actually unable to control himself at
the time of the criminal act may be enough to gain acquittal. See Note, The XYY Chromo-
some Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892, 909 (1969).
81. The Durham test was developed in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir'. 1954).
32. Id. at 874.
33. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
34. Id. at 851. Judge Bazelon of the Durham court intentionally failed to define mental
disease or defect in that case in order to allow the greatest leeway for psychiatric testi-
mony. However, a standardized definition was made imperative by the practical difficul-
ties of allowing doctors to define mental disease in varying terms.
65. Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The act is a product
of the disease if the accused would not have committed the act if he did not suffer from
the disease. Id.
36. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
87. Frigillana v. United States, 307 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
88. See Note, The XYY Choromosome Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892, 909-911 (1969).
39. Id.
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A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct 'or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.
40
The significant issues regarding the XYY syndrome in ALI jurisdic-
tions are whether the XYY syndrome is a mental disease or defect,
and whether as a result of such disease or defect, the defendant
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law. Since total lack of control is not required, 41 if the
individual finds it extremely difficult to control his behavior, this
might be sufficient to sustain a defense based on the XYY abnor-
mality.
In the Maryland case of Millard v. State,4 2 the XYY defense was
not considered sufficient to rebut the presumption of sanity, and
thus the issue was not allowed to go to the jury. The court in that
case utilized a sanity test based upon the ALI test.4 3 In an attempt
to rebut the presumption of sanity, defense counsel in Millard called
only one expert witness, a geneticist, who admitted having no
training in psychiatry, and who was completely unfamiliar with le-
gal standards for sanity in general, and the Maryland test in par-
ticular.44 At the conclusion of the geneticist's testimony, the trial
judge concluded that the defense had rebutted the presumption of
sanity, and stated that he was prepared to allow evidence relating
to the XYY syndrome to go to the jury. However, the state's psy-
chaitrist was then allowed to testify on the XYY abnormality, and
after hearing his testimony the trial judge became convinced that
the XYY syndrome was not a mental defect, but was instead a phy-
sical defect not affecting the mental functioning of the brain. The
appellate court, in affirming the order, did not find the XYY de-
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962). This test appears to
be a combination of Durham (result of mental disease or defect), the irresistible impulse
test (capacity to conform conduct), and M'Naughten (capacity to appreciate criminality).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment, at 158 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
Nothing makes the inquiry into responsibility more unreal . . . than limita-
tions of the issue to some ultimate extreme of total incapacity. . . . The
law must recognize that when there is no black and white it must content
itself with different shades of gray. The draft, accordingly, does not demand
complete impairment of capacity. It asks instead for substantial impairment
[emphasis In the original].
Id.
42. 8 Md. App. 419, 26t A.2d 227 (1970).
43. Id. at - , 261 A.2d at 228.
A defendant Is not responsible for criminal conduct and shall be found Insane
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime if, at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law. As used In this section, the terms 'mental di-
sease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 9(a) (1957) (reserved 1972).
44. Millard V. State, 8 Md. App. 419, - , 261 A.2d 227, 228 (1970).
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fense beyond the pale of proof, but only that the trial court had
not been in error in refusing to allow evidence of the XYY syndrome
to go to the jury.4 5
In another New York case. People v. Farley,46 Judge Farrell
permitted evidence of an XYY syndrome to go to the jury on the
issue of insanity. New York also utilizes a sanity test based upon
the ALI rule.4 7 Defense counsel in that case called two expert wit-
nesses: a psychiatrist to deal with the defendant's mental state at
the time of the commission of the crime, and a medical doctor, en-
gaged in genetic research, to introduce evidence regarding the XYY
syndrome. The question of sanity was submitted to a jury, which
found Farley guilty of murder.48
North Dakota also follows the ALI rule.49 As noted above, this
test does not demand complete impairment of capacity, but only
"substantial" impairment."s In North Dakota, the XYY syndrome
might well be significant in establishing that a defendant having the
XYY abnormality lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.5 ' It would appear that the best
course of action for an 'attorney defending an XYY individual in a
state such as North Dakota would be to call upon both a geneticist
and a psychiatrist to give expert testimony on behalf of the defen-
dant at trial. The geneticist's role would be to testify as to the in-
dividual's genetic structure, and the psychiatrist would then use the
genetic findings in demonstrating substantial impairment in the de-
fendant's mental capacity.
There are courts in other countries which have accepted the XYY
Syndrome as part of a valid insanity defense. In Australia, Laurence
E. Hannell, a 21-year-old male affiliated with the XYY genetic ab-
normality, was accused of fatally !stabbing a 77-year-old widow.52
45. Millard v. State, 8 Md. App. 419, 261 A.2d 227 (1970). The failure of the defense to
call a psychiatrist to deal with the sanity issue, in addition to the geneticist who testified
regarding the XYY syndrome, was quite possibly a determining factor in the case.
46. No. 1827 (Sup. Ct. Queens County, April 30, 1969). N.Y. Times, April 30, 1969, at
93, col. 4 (city ed.).
47. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 90.05 (McKinney 1967). It reads in part:
1. A person Is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
to know or appreciate either:
a. The nature and consequence of such conduct;
or
b. That such conduct was wrong.
Id.
48. N.Y. Times, April 30, 1969, at 93, col. 4 (city ed.).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-03 (Supp. 1975). It states in part:
A person Is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
Id.
50. See Note 41, supra, and text accompanying.
51. See Notes 40-41, supra, and text accompanying.
52. Stock, The XYY and the Criminal, The New York Times Magazine, Oct. 20, 1968, at
97, col. 1. The case was tried in the Melbourne Criminal Court on October 9, 1968.
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During his 1968 trial, a psychiatrist testified that the defendant had
the XYY chromosomal make-up, "which means that every cell in
his body and the brain is abnormal."'" Hannell was acquitted by
the jury on the ground that he was insane when he committed the
murder.5 4
The XYY syndrome was also raised as a defense in a French
court during the 1968 murder trial of Daniel Hugon, 5 who was al-
leged to have killed a prostitute in a Paris hotel. The defense intro-
duced scientific evidence of a link between the XYY 'syndrome and
the accused's criminal behavior. Although the court found Hugon
legally sane, it considered the XYY abnormality as a mitigating
factor in sentencing. 56
The decision by the New York court in Yukl not to allow evi-
dence of Yukl's XYY syndrome as part of the defense of insanity
in his murder trial is perhaps questionable. New York follows the
ALI rule 57 as to the defense of insanity, and it could have been
left to the jury to decide whether the XYY abnormality caused a
substantial impairment of Yukl's capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law. The limited case law in ALl juris-
dictions and elsewhere on the XYY syndrome indicated that the syn-
drome might validly be considered in cases involving a defense of
insanity. 5' Although more research is probably necessary to clearly
establish the genetic imbalance theory of crime causation, 59 Yukl
perhaps should have been allowed to bring in experts in the fields
of psychiatry and genetics to attempt to establish the link between
his genetic structure and a substantial impairment in his mental ca-
pacity.
TOM ALJETS
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-INFANTS-PHYSICIAN'S LIABILITY FOR
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH CHILD ABUSE REPORTING STATUTE
Plaintiff, an 11-month-,old child, was taken by her mother to de-
fendant hospital for treatment and diagnosis of a fracture in her
53. Id.
54. It is Impossible to know what signifance the jury attached to the XYY condition,
since other evidence was introduced to show insanity in more conventional psychiatric
terms. Id. at 97, col. 2.
55. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1968, at 5, col. 4 (city ed.). A chromosome analysis made
after an attempted suicide by -ugon revealed that he had the XYY genetic abnormality.
56. Id.
57. See Note 47, supra.
58. See Notes 42-48, supra, and text accompanying.
59. See Note 2, supro.
